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The Establishment Clause Gag Reflex 
Frederick Mark Gedicks.∗ 
Last summer, I attended a dinner with some law professors who 
write about Religion Clause issues. It is a measure of our lack of 
imagination that we spent most of the evening talking about—you 
guessed it—Religion Clause issues. As the conversation progressed, I 
found myself defending the results in various cases on what I 
described as “realist” grounds—that is, not on the basis of 
supposedly “neutral principles,” but by reference to my assessment 
of the kinds of church-state interactions that most Americans would 
tolerate. At one point in the conversation, someone suggested—and 
to date no one has been willing to accept credit or blame for it—that 
I was relying on an “Establishment Clause gag reflex.” 
The conventional way of titling a paper is to write the paper first, 
then to choose a title that captures and communicates the paper’s 
thesis. But I was so taken with the idea encapsulated within this 
phrase—the Establishment Clause gag reflex—that when I was asked 
to participate on this panel, I decided that this would be my title, 
around which I would write the paper. The Establishment Clause 
gag reflex is an instinctive intellectual revulsion to the possibility of 
particular resolutions of Establishment Clause cases. Though not a 
doctrinal rule, it emphasizes important constitutional instincts about 
the Establishment Clause when the apparently correct doctrinal 
resolution of a case seems untenable. 
In medical terms, the “gag reflex” refers to the normal choking 
or retching reflex “caused esp[ecially] by stimulation (as by touch) of 
the pharynx.”1 The term derives from the verb “to gag,” which 
means to nauseate or to choke,2 combined with the noun “reflex,” 
which refers, among other things, to “an act . . . performed 
automatically and without conscious volition in consequence of a 
∗ Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. This essay 
is based on remarks delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law 
Schools Section on Law and Religion in Atlanta, Georgia, on January 3, 2004. I am grateful to 
my friend and colleague Brett Scharffs for the invitation to speak at that meeting. 
 1. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MEDICAL DESK DICTIONARY 293 (1996). 
 2. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 928 (2002). 
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nervous impulse.”3 As an involuntary physical response, the gag 
reflex is often grouped with other so-called “unconditioned” physical 
responses that share the characteristic of being “automatic instinctive 
unlearned reaction[s] to [some] stimulus.”4 
“Gag” and “gag reflex” have long had figurative as well as 
physiological meanings. In fact, figurative usage is quite evident on 
the Internet—there is an apparent competition among a certain class 
of bloggers5 to see who can publicize the most disgusting 
anecdotes—that is, anecdotes that might make one gag. These 
entries are typically posted with “gag reflex” in the title or subject 
line, so they pop right up in a Google search. (I will spare the reader 
the actual examples, but they provide yet another illustration of the 
wondrous information that the digital revolution has placed at our 
fingertips.) 
In a more conventional vein, the Oxford English Dictionary 
includes a number of figurative usages of the verb “to gag,” 
including one from a nineteenth-century dictionary—“to reject with 
loathing”6—and this suggestively obsessive one from John Steinbeck: 
“The idea gagged him, but he couldn’t let it alone.”7 In its figurative 
sense, then, “gag reflex” refers to an immediate, intellectually 
instinctive reaction of disgust or rejection when confronted with a 
distasteful idea, event, or situation. 
A constitutional gag reflex would refer to the instinctive 
intellectual revulsion one might feel in response to the doctrine or 
holding of a case. One would hope, for example, that a 
contemporary judicial decision that countenanced permanent denial 
of citizenship to racial minorities8 or that denied such minorities the 
liberty or equality rights enjoyed by whites9 would induce a collective 
 3. Id. at 1908. 
 4. THE FREE DICTIONARY, at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/gag reflex (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2004). 
 5. “Blogger” refers to a person who posts regular comments to one of the online 
journals, known as “weblogs” or “blogs,” which are increasingly appearing on the World Wide 
Web. 
 6. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/ 
entry/00091556?query_type=word&queryword=gag (quoting ROBERT FORBY, THE 
VOCABULARY OF EAST ANGLIA (1825)). 
 7. Id. (quoting JOHN STEINBECK, CANNERY ROW 107 (1945)). 
 8. See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
 9. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537 (1896). 
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“gag” by most Americans. The constitutional gag reflex functions 
rhetorically much like the “parade of horribles,” in which one 
typically lists all of the ostensible horrors that would follow from the 
outcome one opposes. Justice Scalia relied on this technique to good 
(if controversial) effect in Employment Division v. Smith.10 However, 
the parade of horribles derives its rhetorical force as much from the 
length of the parade as from its participants, whereas the 
constitutional gag reflex is triggered by a sole potentiality whose 
singular undesirability is so obvious that its mere possibility causes 
one instinctively to shudder, albeit intellectually. 
A little over twenty years ago, shortly after I graduated from law 
school, Federal District Judge Brevard Hand of Alabama held that 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment did not apply to 
the states and that as a consequence Alabama was constitutionally 
empowered to establish an official state church if it wished.11 Now, 
the application of the First Amendment and the other substantive 
provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states is an impossibly arcane 
topic that exists as an issue at all only because the Supreme Court 
bungled the Slaughter-House Cases.12 Ask ten ordinary people—ask a 
hundred ordinary people—what incorporation of the Bill of Rights is 
about, and chances are that none of them will have the least idea 
what it is, let alone how it works. (This may be true even if the 
hundred people are law students, as I am reminded every year by the 
struggles of my first-year constitutional law students with 
“absorption,”13 “ordered liberty,”14 “fundamental fairness,”15 
 10. 494 U.S. 872, 888–89 (1990) (arguing that requiring incidental burdens on 
religious practices to be justified by a compelling governmental interest “would open the 
prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost 
every conceivable kind—ranging from compulsory military service, to the payment of taxes, to 
health and safety regulation such as manslaughter and child neglect laws, compulsory 
vaccination laws, drug laws, and traffic laws, to social welfare legislation such as minimum wage 
laws, child labor laws, animal cruelty laws, environmental protection laws, and laws providing 
for equality of opportunity for the races” (citations omitted)). 
 11. Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1118–19 (S.D. Ala. 1983). 
 12. 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (holding, inter alia, that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not subject the states to the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights or to the natural rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV). There is widespread academic agreement that this holding is simply wrong as a matter of 
history. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 207–10 (1989); MICHAEL KENT 
CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 172–79 (1986). 
 13. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937). 
 14. Id. at 325. 
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“jot[s]-for-jot[s],”16 and other subtle variations on how most of the 
substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights came to bind the states.) 
But tell these same people that the Establishment Clause would not 
prevent Alabama from designating, say, all congregations affiliated 
with the Southern Baptist Convention as official state churches 
entitled to preferential state funding and other special privileges, and 
they will react with instinctive incredulity, just as I did: “What? No 
way!” (or, in our current post-Seinfeldian era, “Get out.!”). 
Predictably, Judge Hand’s incorporation holding—or, rather, his 
nonincorporation holding—was quickly reversed.17 
Hypothetical reactions to Judge Hand’s decision illustrate quite 
well how the constitutional gag reflex works: it is an immediate, 
intellectually instinctive reaction against an untenable result. The 
reaction is rarely rooted in reason or principle; it is the intellectual 
equivalent of a physical reflex—not the result of voluntary thinking, 
but rather an instant deduction from background assumptions that 
are rarely discussed. There are, in fact, serious difficulties with 
incorporation of the Establishment Clause, including that the Clause 
was apparently designed as a federalist protection of state 
establishments18 and that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
 15. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942). 
 16. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 17. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1532 (11th Cir. 1983), aff’d, 466 U.S. 924 
(1984). 
 18. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on 
Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 26 (1998) (“Ignoring federalism in the 
[Establishment] Clause was an act of sheer judicial will which is still debated by academicians 
today.”); Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1700, 1709–12 (1992) (arguing that because the Establishment Clause is 
a structural limitation on Congress enacted to preserve state regulatory control over religion 
against federal encroachment, its incorporation against the states was incoherent). See generally 
Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1608–09 (1995) (arguing that as a 
structural provision designed to protect the states against congressional interference, “the 
entire First Amendment [is] a poor candidate for any textually rigorous theory of 
incorporation”). Justice Brennan authored the classic defense of incorporation of the 
Establishment Clause in his concurring opinion in School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 
256 (1963), arguing that extension of the antiestablishment prohibition to the states was 
necessary for the United States to fully realize the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious 
liberty. For an academic defense of Establishment Clause incorporation, see Kurt T. Lash, The 
Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995). 
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had precious little to say about state establishments.19 It is not 
difficult to construct a plausible argument that the Establishment 
Clause either cannot be or was not incorporated against the states. 
But none of this really matters very much. As a country, and certainly 
as an academy, we have heard and talked and thought and written 
about separation of church and state to such an extent that, whatever 
we might think the Establishment Clause does or does not prohibit, 
we agree that the very idea that it might permit a classic state-
established church is simply unthinkable.20 It is the unthinkability of 
the state-established church, not its purported unjustifiability, that 
constitutes the most powerful argument against it. This is the 
Establishment Clause gag reflex. 
Recurrence to the Establishment Clause gag reflex is a helpful 
way to think about the current state of Establishment Clause 
doctrine. For the last two decades, the rhetorical center of the Clause 
has shifted from a concern with separating church and state to a 
concern with treating religion neutrally or equally with respect to 
secular activities.21 The question of the day is whether neutrality 
should entirely displace separation or whether separation should 
continue to trump neutrality in some situations. If neutrality is 
conceptually pushed as far as it can go, the outcomes it justifies 
could trigger the Establishment Clause gag reflex. The Court has 
declined to allow neutrality entirely to displace separation as a 
 19. MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 87–90 
(2002) (summarizing the historical difficulties with incorporation of the Establishment 
Clause). 
 20. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 
43 B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1090–95 (2002) (arguing that the virtually undisputed central meaning 
of the Establishment Clause is prohibition of a government-established church that exercised 
government authority, received government financial support, and was subjected to 
government control). But see Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 
2330–31 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The text and history of the 
Establishment Clause strongly suggest that it is a federalism provision intended to prevent 
Congress from interfering with state establishments. Thus, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, 
which does protect an individual right, it makes little sense to incorporate the Establishment 
Clause. . . . As strange as it sounds, an incorporated Establishment Clause prohibits exactly 
what the Establishment Clause protected—state practices that pertain to ‘an establishment of 
religion.’”). 
 21. For an account of this shift, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, Neutrality in Establishment 
Clause Interpretation: Its Past and Future, in CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN CRISIS: 
DEBATING NEUTRALITY 191 (Stephen V. Monsma ed., 2002). 
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doctrinal principle,22 but has not attempted to define the limit on 
neutrality. 
Locke v. Davey,23 for example, seemed to be about religious 
discrimination, as the appellee and the dissenting Justices argued.24 
The State’s denial of a widely available state scholarship to students 
solely because they were pursuing a divinity or theology degree 
certainly looked like the straightforward, garden-variety religious 
discrimination that the Equal Protection, Free Exercise, and 
Establishment Clauses all prohibit.25 It also looked like content-
based discrimination by the State against certain programs of 
religious education (which, after all, is speech).26 Neutrality would 
seem to require that religious individuals who otherwise qualify for 
state educational aid not be denied such aid simply because of their 
theological course of study. 
But if this doctrinal principle had been implemented, it would 
have inevitably triggered paradigm violations of the Establishment 
Clause. For example, if a state made block grants available to local 
governments for construction of community centers, would the state 
 22. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 304–05 (2000) 
(invalidating invocations led by popularly elected student designees prior to high school 
football games). 
 23. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004). 
 24. Id. at 1312, 1315–16 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 25. With respect to the Equal Protection Clause, see Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 
268, 271 (1951), which held that the denial of an application by Jehovah’s Witnesses’ to use a 
city park because of government distaste for Witnesses’ beliefs violated the “right to equal 
protection of the laws, in the exercise of those freedoms of speech and religion protected by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” See also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that a “presumption of constitutionality” should not 
attach to “statutes directed at particular religions”); Am. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 
89, 92 (1900) (suggesting that tax exemptions drawn on the basis of “color, race, nativity, 
religious opinions, political affiliations, or other considerations having no possible connection 
with the duties of citizens as taxpayers” are “purely arbitrary, oppressive, or capricious” and 
deny “the equal protection of the laws to the less favored classes”). With respect to the Free 
Exercise Clause, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
547 (1993), which states, “Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, 
designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices.” With respect to the Establishment 
Clause, see Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246–47 (1982), where a statute whose effect was 
to subject only certain minority religions to fundraising registration and reporting 
requirements was found to be suspect denominational preference under the Establishment 
Clause, which must be “closely fitted” to furthering a “compelling governmental interest.” See 
also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the 
Establishment Clause prohibits government from using religion “as a basis of classification for 
the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or benefits”). 
 26. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312 n.3. 
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really be constitutionally prohibited from withholding grants from 
those cities that wish to use the grants to construct churches? If 
government provides money to subsidize the salaries of those who 
run youth recreation programs, must it allow the money to subsidize 
the salary of a church’s youth recreation minister? And if government 
chooses to fund the provision of social services by private groups or 
individuals, must it fund religious worship or conversion that is 
integrated into such services? Much of the United States and most of 
the legal academy would gag on each of these. 
The Establishment Clause gag reflex was very much in evidence 
at the oral argument of Davey. Moderate and liberal Justices 
repeatedly asked Davey’s counsel, Jay Sekulow, whether it could 
really be correct that a state’s decision to subsidize secular activities 
triggers a constitutional obligation to subsidize all comparable 
religious activities. The incredulity of these Justices at Mr. Sekulow’s 
defense of this principle was evident.27 What was surprising about the 
Court’s decision in Davey was not its holding that the state’s refusal 
to fund devotional education did not constitute prohibited 
discrimination under the Free Exercise Clause,28 but its failure to cite 
the abortion-funding decisions, which had already established that a 
state’s subsidization of some constitutionally protected activities does 
not require that the state subsidize all comparable or related 
constitutional activities.29 
One can also use the Establishment Clause gag reflex as a 
negative indicator—that is, as a means of ascertaining that no 
constitutional violation exists despite the presence of a church-state 
relation that seems clearly to violate the Clause, because the apparent 
violation simply does not induce a gag. Professor Marshall, for 
 27. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 31–32, 39, Davey (No. 02–1315) 
(expressing skepticism at Mr. Sekulow’s contention that inclusion of religious schools in an 
educational-voucher system is constitutionally required); see also id. at 47 (relating Mr. 
Sekulow’s agreement that “if the state has a general program for funding instruction, and this 
is religious instruction, it’s got to fund religious instruction and there’s no middle ground, 
there’s no play in the joints there”). 
 28. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1313 (“The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct 
category of instruction.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (upholding federal regulations 
that prohibited institutional recipients of Title X funds from discussing abortion as a method of 
family planning and that further required that abortion services be provided by such recipients 
in a physically separate location); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding a state 
Medicaid program that paid for medical expenses of childbirth but not for medical expenses 
associated with elective abortion). 
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example, has suggested that the widespread government 
endorsements of religious worship and expression in the wake of the 
September 11 trade tower bombings were obvious formal violations 
of the Establishment Clause but should not be treated as such.30 I 
have a similar view of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Newdow v. U.S. 
Congress,31 which declared that inclusion of the words “under God” 
in the Pledge of Allegiance violates the Establishment Clause.32 
Amidst all the political controversy triggered by this decision, one 
can lose sight of the fact that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the case 
was an unremarkable, even mundane, application of Supreme Court 
precedent.33 Nevertheless, it is hard to get very distressed about a 
government-sponsored ceremony whose content is almost entirely 
secular and patriotic and in which religious and secular dissenters 
may decline to participate or may meaningfully participate without 
voicing the religious content in question. It just does not induce a 
gag. 
Now, I realize that it is rather undignified to assess a rule of 
law—especially a rule of constitutional law—in terms of whether it 
makes you want to throw up, even if only figuratively. But this is not 
so unusual, even in constitutional law. Justice Holmes’s test for the 
constitutionality of economic legislation, for example, was the 
constitutional gag reflex: so long as the government had considered 
all of the relevant factors, its judgment should be accepted “unless it 
makes us puke.”34 There has long been a “shock-the-conscience” test 
 30. William P. Marshall, The Limits of Secularism: Public Religious Expression in Moments 
of National Crisis and Tragedy, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11 (2002). 
 31. 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Elk Grove Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). 
 32. Id. at 490. 
 33. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (invalidating a school’s practice of 
prayer at graduation ceremonies because “at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that 
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise”); W. 
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631, 633 (1943) (finding that a school 
district’s mandatory pledge-recital policy unconstitutionally “comp[els]” students “to declare a 
belief” and improperly “requires the individual to communicate by word and sign his 
acceptance of the political ideas [the flag] . . . bespeaks”); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (“The 
undeniable fact is that the school district's supervision and control of a . . . ceremony places 
public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, 
maintain respectful silence during the [ceremony]. This pressure, though subtle and indirect, 
can be as real as any overt compulsion.”). 
 34. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, to Harold J. Laski (Oct. 23, 1926), in 2 
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 888 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).  
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in criminal procedure under the Due Process Clause,35 and more 
recently there has arisen an “undue” burden test for the 
constitutionality of abortion regulations under the same Clause36—
these are little different from gag reflex tests. Indeed, the foundation 
of the right to sexual privacy, articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut,37 
clearly rests on the gag reflex triggered by imagined enforcement of a 
law that prohibited the use of condoms by married couples, as 
opposed to their mere sale or distribution.38 Even familiar tests like 
the average-reasonable-person test for negligence and—yes!—the 
much maligned “objective observer” test bequeathed to us by Justice 
O’Connor,39 though they lack the edge implied by “gag reflex,” are 
really just more formal ways of posing the question: “Would most 
people find it unthinkable for the defendant or the government to 
act in this way, or not?” Like the average reasonable person, the 
objective observer can be filled up with whatever knowledge and 
characteristics are needed to justify a particular decision. 
But the gag reflex is not only familiar, it is also fundamental to 
constitutional doctrine, although we may not like to admit it. When 
doctrinal resources allow multiple, inconsistent, equally plausible 
 35. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (characterizing a forcible 
pumping of defendant’s stomach as police conduct that “shocks the conscience” and thereby 
violates the constitutional guarantee of due process). 
 36. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (plurality 
opinion) (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to 
make this decision [to abort her pregnancy] does the power of the State reach into the heart of 
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”). 
 37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
 38. See id. at 485–86 (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of 
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the 
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 
497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
  Of this whole “private realm of family life” it is difficult to imagine what is 
more private or more intimate than a husband and wife’s marital relations. . . .  
  . . . . 
  . . . [T]he intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted 
feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State not only must 
allow, but which always and in every age it has fostered and protected. It is one 
thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-marital sexuality 
altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when, having 
acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate 
by means of the criminal law the details of that intimacy. 
Id. at 552–53. 
 39. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688–90 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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outcomes to a case—as is almost always the situation in Supreme 
Court litigation—then clearly doctrine is not deciding the case. 
Under the Establishment Clause, neutrality may be the more 
principled and dependable doctrine, but separation of church and 
state has long been part of our constitutional tradition and prevents 
us from swallowing many church-state relationships and 
arrangements that are fully justified by neutrality. The Establishment 
Clause gag reflex, in other words, gives voice to an important 
constitutional instinct about church-state relations that might not 
otherwise be expressed. 
Let me close with a question asked by Justice Breyer of the 
Solicitor General, Theodore Olson, at oral argument in Davey: 
QUESTION: What — what is your response to the following 
concern that’s been brought up a few times but I’d like you to 
address it directly. This case is perhaps a small matter of a 
distinction that doesn’t make all that much sense, but makes some. 
But the implications of this case are breathtaking, that it would 
mean if your side wins, that every program, not just educational 
programs, but nursing programs, hospital programs, social welfare 
programs, contracting programs throughout the governments 
would go over, you’d have to go over each of them and there’d be 
a claim in each instance that they cannot be purely secular, that 
they must fund all religions who want to do the same thing, and 
that those religions, by the way, though it may be an excellent 
principle, may get into fights with each other about billions and 
billions of dollars . . . . So, I’d like you to address that. 
MR. OLSON: Yes, Justice Breyer. It is not a major step at all in 
this Court’s jurisprudence . . . .40 
What? Get out.! 
 40. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51–52, Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004) 
(No. 02–1315). In fairness to General Olson, his full response made this point in a more 
nuanced way. His full answer to the question argued that it 
is not a major step in this Court’s jurisprudence to say that those funding programs 
for medicine, doctors, nurses, cannot distinguish and not discriminate against a 
person who decides to go to a Catholic nurse or to a Catholic doctor. If money is 
made available for individuals in the Medicare program to exclude people that want 
to go to religious hospitals for their heart surgery, that would violate the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
Id. at 52. 
